INTRODUCTION
Ever since the term was coined from financial options by Stewart Myers of MIT Sloan School of Management in 1977, real options theory has found wide applications in diverse areas of management. The interests of academic and practitioners alike were borne out of the fact that this new capital appraisal technique encourages active approach to the valuation of capital projects as opposed to the traditional passive management of investment projects.
Real options techniques have been applied to investments in natural resource extraction (Brennan & Schwartz, 1985; Davis, 1998; Paddock, et al., 1988; Trigeorgis, 1993a) , real estate development (Titman, 1985) , biotechnology (Benninga & Tolkowsky, 2002; Ottoo, 1998) , information & communication technology (Arya & Glover, 2003; Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999; Benaroch & Kauffman, 2000; Panayi & Trigeorgis, 1998; Schwartz & Zozaya-Gorostiza, 2000) , infrastructure (Brandao & Saraiva, 2008; Cardin & de Neufville, 2009; Caselli, et al., 2009; Cheah & Liu, 2006; Doan & Menyah, 2013; Huang & Chou, 2006; Kulatilaka, 1993; Rose, 1998; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2009 ) and other capital-intensive capital projects. In addition real options frameworks have been argued to aid managers in taking strategic business decisions (Adams, 2004; Luehrman, 1998; McGrath, 1997; Tong, et al., 2008) . Of all the investment categories, infrastructure investments have enjoyed wide applications of real options techniques because of their highly irreversible nature and uncertainties in project revenues and in most cases project costs.
Valuing investments in infrastructure using the traditional discounted cash flow (NPV and IRR) techniques can greatly undervalue the projects as the techniques usually fail to value the flexibilities, in form of real options, embedded in the projects. It has been argued that real options valuations are usually fruitful in an investment proposal when there is a contingent investment decision, when uncertainty is large enough that it is sensible to wait for more information and when the project value depends on the possibilities for future growth options (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999) . Other criteria, according to the authors, include when uncertainty is large enough to make flexibility a consideration and when there will be project updates and mid-course strategy corrections. Virtually all investments in infrastructure (transport -rails, roads and ports, energy, telecommunication and water resources) meet these criteria thus making them highly suitable for real options applications. However, in practice, the level of formal adoption of real options techniques in capital budgeting including in infrastructure investments is still low (Ahmed, et al., 2011; Block, 2007; Denison, et al., 2012; Triantis, 2005) . The non-consideration of flexibilities or real options in infrastructure investments has impacted negatively on the financial viabilities of these projects.
Infrastructure investments have thus been traditionally left in the hands of governments who invest in them for the socio-economic benefits of the people. Even the new trend of private sector participation in infrastructure investment through public-private partnership (PPP) has not sufficiently made infrastructure projects financially viable. Government supports to the projects still come in various forms such as fixed or variable government payments, payment guarantee, development cost guarantee, revenue and interest/exchange rate guarantees among others.
It is expected that if PPP infrastructure projects are appraised using real option techniques, various real options can be built into the projects to enhance their values. The enhancements of the project values using real options will make the projects more valuable and thus reduce the level of fixed government support to the project. This paper sets out to examine the different forms of real options in infrastructure investments and how they affect the viabilities of the infrastructure projects. It uses data from the global PPP infrastructure project database for the empirical analysis. The paper argues that various types of infrastructure investments have, incorporated into them, different combinations of real options. If real options expand the values of investment projects, it is therefore expected that infrastructure projects with more real options will be more valuable than the infrastructure project types with fewer real options. It is thus expected that projects with more real options will require less fixed government support. Using the data on infrastructure projects and the types and levels of government supports provided, the paper shows empirically the relationship between real options and the levels of government supports to infrastructure projects.
Incorporations of real options into infrastructure investments are expected to expand the values of the projects and in the process make them to require little or no fixed government support. This will thus lead to deployment of more infrastructure projects with the same government budget and the attendant improvements in socio-economic well-being of the people. The long-term nature of PPP infrastructure contracts affords the parties the opportunities to embed different types of real options, in forms of clauses, into the contracts.
The clauses will limit downside losses from the project in an unfavourable economic situation while the investors will maximize upside potentials in favourable conditions. Both the government and the private sector participants will thus benefit from successful deployments of these PPP projects. The private sector players earn commensurate returns from their investments while the public sector party also provides key infrastructure to the citizenry at favourable costs to the government. The final users equally enjoy these infrastructure projects at affordable user fees. The paper therefore extends the literature on real options by examining the effects of real options in PPP infrastructure projects on government supports to these projects and hence the viabilities of the projects.
This section discusses the background of the study and its general introduction. The next section reviews the literature on real options theory as it relates to investments in infrastructure. The section reviews extant literature on real options types in infrastructure investments and the various forms of government supports to infrastructure projects. It furthers discusses how incorporations of real options and their subsequent formal valuations in infrastructure projects affect the levels of fixed government supports and hence the viabilities of these projects. The third section discusses the data and the sample used in the study and develops statistical models to show the relationship between the categories of common real options in various infrastructure types and the levels of fixed government supports to the infrastructure projects. The section also explores the non-fixed government supports and their distribution among the project types. The fourth section discusses the findings and their contributions to extant literature on real options. The section also discusses the limitations of the study and possible areas for future research. Section five concludes the paper.
REAL OPTIONS AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
Traditional investment appraisal techniques have been shown to ignore values from active management of investment projects (Trigeorgis, 1993b) . The different types of real options identified in the literature (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Trigeorgis, 1993a; Trigeorgis, 1993b) have been shown to expand the values of investment projects. The common types of real options that can be embedded into investment projects include option to defer, time-to-build option, option to alter operating scale, option to abandon, option to switch, growth option and multiple interacting option (Trigeorgis, 1993a ). Yet from another perspective, the different types of investments incorporating real options include irreversible, flexibility, insurance, modular, platform and learning investments (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999) . The real options incorporated into these capital investments give managers the flexibilities for active management of the projects and the accompanying expansion of the project values. The options enable managers to respond favourably to unfolding developments in the construction and/or operation of the projects. Thus if the options are included and correctly valued in these projects, they will enable the managers to take better investment decisions.
Although valuations of real options in investment projects usually involve relatively complex mathematical techniques, simpler and more tractable real option techniques are now common and are now being considered by managers. It is now even more common for managers to intuitively incorporate real options into their investment projects. Managers can break the development of projects into stages (time-to-build option), wait for the resolution of a key macroeconomic variable before investing (option to defer), build a project with two or more inputs or a project with two or more outputs (option to switch) and/or start a project small or big and then expand or contract it later (option to alter operating scale). Managers can also intuitively consider opportunities for follow-on investments (growth option) in their investment decisions and possibilities of abandoning and selling the project assets for their salvage values (option to abandon) in very extreme unfavourable market conditions. These are common practices in today's project management approaches. Proofs-of-concept (POCs) or pilot implementations are first carried out before full-scale deployments of capital projects to identify potential risks and management responses to them. These all affect the project costs and proposed revenues and can be regarded as intuitive incorporation of real options into capital projects. These are even more common in highly capital-intensive infrastructure projects. This paper thus proposes that the presence of these risk management flexibilities or real options will positively affect the viabilities of PPP infrastructure projects.
Real Options and Infrastructure Investments
Investments in infrastructure are key to economic growth and development of a nation. Even at the level of a firm, investment in key infrastructure provides opportunities for follow-on investments which can lead to the firm's growth should the operating environment turns out to be highly favourable. Public utilities, known as infrastructure, are vital to the nation's production and distribution of economic output as well as to its citizens' overall quality of life (Algarni, et al., 2007 Energy PPP infrastructure projects mostly involve electricity generation and in some cases natural gas transmission and distribution. The projects are usually marred with a lot of uncertainties not only in the demand for the power output but also in the volatilities in prices of the commodities used as inputs for the generation of electricity. The projects thus have the potential for incorporating virtually all the options types as shown in Table I . In the same way, real options categories that can be embedded in transport, telecommunication and water & sewerage projects types are also as shown in the table. Table I is the author's adaption of Trigeorgis' common real options (Trigeorgis, 1993a) . In a similar manner, the infrastructure types can also be categorized using the Amram & Kulatilaka's perspectives of real options. Table II Tables I and II projects potentially include valuable options in them, it is argued that they embed less options and are expected to be less viable and thus require higher levels of fixed government support.
Government Support in infrastructure investment
Valuation of infrastructure investments using the traditional NPV technique usually results in "reject" investment decisions as the techniques often time fail to include values that can be derived from embedding real options into the projects. The participation of private investors in the delivery of infrastructural services through PPP has led to more complex analyses of the projects. The private partners are traditionally more interested in earning returns commensurate with the opportunity costs of their investments. To encourage the investors and to also ensure that the projects are delivered for the socio-economic benefits of the people, the parties usually include a number of negotiated clauses into the contracts. For example in a power plant, such clauses may include those that ensure that gas is supplied regularly to the plant under some agreed conditions and that a power purchase agreement is in place for the power output. In a toll road, government may be required to guarantee minimum yearly revenues from the road project while in water infrastructure project government may subsidize the cost by making a particular payment to the private investors.
All these require rigorous valuations and negotiations from both parties to determine whether government support will be required and the forms and the levels of the government supports.
Researchers have attempted to value various types of government supports to infrastructure projects using real options valuation techniques. For example the valuation of minimum revenue guarantee in toll road infrastructure projects using real options (Brandao & Saraiva, 2008; Cheah & Liu, 2006; Doan & Pate, 2010; Huang & Chou, 2006) and the pricing of final indemnification payments to private sponsors in a PPP project (Caselli, et al., 2009) .
However some other studies used a different pricing methodology. For example the valuation of government support to infrastructure projects using CAPM-based valuation technique (Wibowo, 2006) . The enormous PPP infrastructure risks are usually allocated to parties best able to manage them. This in a way complicates the traditional trade-off between risk and returns of investments in finance. In infrastructure investments, the expected returns from the projects are usually limited by the socio-political factors that affect the pricing of the output even in the face of the enormous risks. Government supports to the projects are thus necessary to make the projects more viable. Other factors that may necessitate the provision of government supports are mismatches in revenue and/or debt currencies. (Ye & Tiong, 2007) the cost exceeds the cap and improves the project revenues for construction costs that are less than the guaranteed amounts. This is another form of real options in infrastructure projects.
Real Options and Government Supports to PPP Infrastructure Projects
In the last set of government support, debt, interest and exchange rate guarantees; 
Sample and Data
The data of 481 infrastructure projects for which government support types are reported are used in this study.
The Types of Government Support
The distribution of the various types of government supports is as shown in Figure I 
The Primary Sectors of the Infrastructure Projects
The infrastructure projects cut across four major primary sectors: energy, transport, telecoms and water & sewerage. The primary sectors and the sub-sector of the reported infrastructure types are as shown in Table III . The primary sectors of the 481 reported infrastructure projects are as shown in Figure II .
The reported primary sector data are measured as categorical data and used in the models developed in this study. The infrastructure types; transport, telecom, water & sewerage and energy are coded 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. In regression analysis, this is implemented using the binary data in 3 binary groupings. In a binary group, the binary data 1 is entered for the infrastructure type variable if the reported data is of a particular infrastructure type while the binary data 0 is given to the other infrastructure types. 
Government Cash Support and Infrastructure Types
The general model showing the relationship between government cash supports and the primary types of the infrastructure projects is shown below:
Where Cash_Support, the dependent variable, is the ratio of government cash support to total investment in each infrastructure project; Infra_Type is the independent variable for infrastructure type using categorical variable 1 for transport, 2 for telecom, 3 for water & 
Government Cash Supports, Infrastructure Types and Project Contract Periods
A new variable, contract period, is added to model 1 above to explore whether the explanatory power of the model will be enhanced if the variable is introduced. The βs and εs are as explained earlier while Pct_Private is the variable for the percentage contribution of the private sector partners to the project.
Government Cash Support, Infrastructure Types and Income Group of the Project's Country
The last set of models investigates the effect of income group of the project's country on the relationship between government cash support and the infrastructure project type. It explores the significance or otherwise of the variable on the relationship. There are two reported income groups in the infrastructure projects' database: the upper middle income group and lower middle income group. The models are presented below:
Income_Grp is the income group of the infrastructure project's country, , and , are the constants of the models, , , , , , , , , , and , are the coefficients of the models and , and , are the error terms.
Model 4a shows whether the income group of the country where the project is developed affects the level of government cash support to the project and hence the viability of the project. Model 4b examines the combined effects of the project type and the three other variables considered in this study (contract period, private sector contribution and income group of the project country) on the level of government cash supports to the studied infrastructure projects.
Other Forms of Government Support and their Analyses
Fixed government payments, mostly government cash supports, constitute about half of the government supports to the infrastructure project data used in this study. The other forms of government supports including payment guarantee, revenue guarantee, variable government payments, debt guarantee, interest rate guarantee, construction cost guarantee, exchange rate guarantee and a combination of two or more government support types constitute the other half. The analysis of the relationships between the infrastructure project types and the nonfixed government supports or real options reported for the projects is done using statistical tables/charts. While 233 of the reported infrastructure projects have fixed government supports in form of government cash supports, the other 248 projects have other forms of government supports given to them. The distribution of the non-fixed government supports among the infrastructure types is as shown in Table IV . 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Real Options, Project Types and Government Cash Supports
Models 1a -1d were implemented in Stata using the infrastructure project data from World Bank's PPI database. An initial analysis of the data shows that no energy infrastructure project received government cash support. This finding suggests that energy-related projects appear to be more viable than the other project types reported in the database used in this study. This also lends support to the earlier arguments that the more the common real options in a PPP infrastructure project, the more viable the project. The Stata output of the regression of the other three project types, transport, telecom and water & sewerage; against government cash support is as shown in Table V . As shown in the table, the regression of the government cash support with infrastructure project types is significant at 95% confidence interval with real options-embedded infrastructure project types explaining about 5% of the changes in government cash supports to the reported projects.
Government Cash Supports and Transport Infrastructure Projects
Model 1a, the sub-model for transport, is not significant at 95%. It is however significant at 90%. From the regression results, it implies that
The model shows that transport project type will have a positive 0.3669697 effect on the level of government cash support. The reported data suggests that at 90% confidence interval, transport projects are not likely to be financially viable without government cash supports.
Although formal incorporations and valuations of common real options are not reported in the PPI database, it is assumed that as a minimum that risk management measures in forms of real options are embedded in the projects. The results thus suggest that transport infrastructure projects will still require government cash supports to be viable even with the current intuitive or formal incorporations of real options.
Government Cash Supports and Telecom Infrastructure Projects
The sub-model for telecom is significant at 95% confidence interval and is stated below:
The regression output shows that telecom infrastructure projects do not require any level of government cash support. The results show that the reported telecom infrastructure projects are viable as implemented with embedded forms of flexibilities or real options. This thus suggests that just like energy infrastructure projects that have no reported case of government cash support, empirical analysis of telecom projects also shows that they do not require government cash support. The reported data thus supports the paper's earlier arguments that based on alignments of common real options with project types, the levels of government cash supports to energy and telecom projects will be less than the level to transport projects.
Government Cash Supports and Water and Sewerage Infrastructure Projects
Since there is no reported valid case of government cash support for energy infrastructure projects, the earlier four sub-models 1a -1d are reduced to three and the model for water and sewerage now becomes
The water and sewerage model is significant and from the model, there is evidence that water and sewerage projects will require high level of government cash support, higher than the level for transport support. Results from the reported project data thus suggest that water and sewerage projects are the least viable of the four projects types. The projects require the highest level of government cash support even with the common real options assumed to be either intuitively or formally incorporated into them. The findings support the arguments that common real options-embedded projects types will affect the levels of government support in the ways suggested earlier in Tables I and II .
Effects of Other Project-Related Factors on Government Cash Supports
The paper examines how the reported PPI project-related factors, contract period, percentage of private sector participation and income group of the project country; combines with project types to affect the levels of government cash supports to the reported projects. The results show that contract period has a negative effect on the level of government cash support to the reported projects. The higher the project contract period, the lower the government cash support to the project. A possible explanation for this is that uncertainties are resolved with increasing years of project contract. Longer years of contract therefore make projects to be more viable and thus require less government cash supports. The inclusion of contract period variable does not however affect the order of the levels of government cash supports to the infrastructure project types.
Effects of Project Types and Contract Period on Government Cash Support
Effects of Project Types and Percentage of Private Sector Participation on Government Cash Support
Tables VII and VIII show the regression results for models 3a and 3b respectively. The two models are significant. The percentage of private sector participation combines with project type to explain 15% of the changes in government cash support. It combines with project type and contract period variables to explain more than 23% of the changes in government cash support. The regression output shows that the higher the percentage of private sector participation in the PPI projects, the lower the level of government cash support to the project. A possible explanation is that private investors tend to look for other areas to make infrastructure projects more viable. These areas include charging user fees and inclusion of other types of government support in forms of guarantees, rather than fixed government cash assistance, in the project contracts. The findings also show that the combinations of the variable with project types and with project types and contract periods do not affect the order of government cash support to the infrastructure project types.
Effects of Project Types and Income Group on Government Cash Support
Models 4a 
Results and Discussion of Other Types of Government Supports
Of the 481 reported PPI project data, 248 of them have other forms of government supports reported for them which are not fixed government support in form of government cash supports. These include construction cost guarantee, interest/exchange rate guarantees, payment/revenue guarantees, debt guarantee, variable government payments and multiple government support. As shown in Table IV , 147 or 59% of the reported PPI projects with these forms of government supports are energy projects, 54 or 22% are water and sewerage projects, 47 or 19% of the projects are transport-related projects while telecom project has no reported case of non-fixed government support. Since these forms of guarantees constitute other forms of real options, the results suggest that energy projects have the most forms of these real options incorporated into them. These guarantees, just like the common real options, protect investors from downside risks and improve the projects' upside potentials.
These findings when combined with the earlier findings that energy projects have nil government cash support given to them suggest that incorporating real options into energy 
Limitations of the Study
The paper uses the reported PPI project data to explore the relationship between real options and financial viabilities of infrastructure projects. Although there are no formal reports of the incorporations of common real options in the project data used in this study, intuitive incorporations of real options are now evident in infrastructure projects. Lack of formal reported data on common real options is however a limitation to this study. To address this shortcoming, future study can collect primary data from surveys of PPP infrastructure projects. Responses to direct survey questions on incorporations of common real options will provide the needed data to further explore the relationship between real options and financial viabilities of infrastructure projects. Another limitation of this study is that the effects of real options are limited to the levels of government cash supports to infrastructure projects.
Although the amount of government cash support to an infrastructure project is a good indicator of the financial viability of an infrastructure project, the availability of data on net present value and/or return on investment of the PPP projects would provide more direct Future studies can explore this area.
CONCLUSION
This study explores the effects of real options on the levels of government supports to infrastructure projects. Governments across the world have had to partner with private investors in the delivery of critical infrastructures to the people. Socio-political considerations however restrict chargeable user fees and hence revenues from the infrastructure projects. As this negatively affects the viabilities of these projects, governments now offer various forms of supports to improve the viabilities of these projects. This paper examines these different and infrastructure projects' profitability data will however be necessary to strengthen the findings of this study.
